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1 Introduction
Financial decisions often involve complexities that individuals have difficulty under-
standing based on their own education, information, and experience. Social net-
works can help ordinary individuals make these complex decisions: people can ac-
quire knowledge about financial product benefits from their friends, be influenced
by their friends’ choices, and/or learn from their experiences with a product. This
paper uses a novel experimental design to obtain clean measurements of the role and
functioning of social networks in the decision to adopt purchase a weather insurance
product, which is typically hard for farmers to understand and has had particularly
low spontaneous take-up in most countries.
We designed a randomized experiment based on the introduction of a new weather
insurance policy for rice farmers, offered by the People’s Insurance Company of China
(PICC), China’s largest insurance provider. Together with PICC, we conducted the
experiment which covered 5,300 households across 185 villages of rural China. Our
experimental design allows us to not only identify and measure the causal effect of
social networks on product adoption, but also to test for the role of various chan-
nels through which social networks operate, including learning from peers about the
function and benefits of insurance and learning from peers’ decisions. Furthermore,
taking advantage of the substantial variation in network structures across households,
we are able to measure the effects of social structures and initial conditions on the
strength of social network effects and mechanisms. Finally, using household level
price randomization, we calculate the price equivalence of the social network effect.
To estimate the value of social networks for insurance take-up, we measure the
spillover effect of providing intensive information sessions about the product to a
subset of farmers on the rest of the farmers in the village. Causality is established in
the following way: we introduced the insurance product through four sessions in each
village, in two rounds three days apart, with one simple session and one intensive
session in each round, randomly assigning households to one of these sessions. For
each household, the social network variable is defined as the fraction of a group of
friends (whose names were identified in a pre-experiment survey) who were invited to
an early round intensive session. We find that, while the intensive information session
raised take-up by 43% in the first round, for second-round participants, having one
additional friend who participate in a first-round intensive session increased take-up
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by almost half as much. The household level price randomization experiment shows
that this spillover effect is equivalent to decreasing the average insurance premium
by 15%.
After observing a large and significant effect of social networks, it is natural to
ask what information conveyed by social networks drives this effect. Do networks
matter because they diffuse knowledge among farmers about the product? Or is it
because farmers learn about each other’s decisions? We find that in this context, social
networks do not convey information about what other people do, even though others
would like to obtain this information, but they do effectively convey information about
what other people know.
This result is obtained in the following manner. First, we compare the effect of the
intensive information session on insurance knowledge between the two rounds. We
find that, in the second round, the effect of the intensive session is smaller than in the
first round, and that farmers understand insurance benefits better when they have a
greater number of friends who were invited to a first round intensive session. These
results show a diffusion of insurance knowledge from first-round intensive session
participants to second-round participants.
Second, we exploit the exogenous variation in both the overall and individual take-
up decisions generated by randomized default options to determine whether or not
subjects are affected by their friends’ decisions. Our findings indicate no significant
effect of friends’ behavior on individuals’ decisions. Surprisingly, however, when we
told farmers about other villagers’ decisions, these decisions actually mattered a lot
to them. This suggests that, in this case, the main mechanism through which social
networks affect decision-making is social learning about insurance benefits, as opposed
to the influence of friends’ purchase decisions which are not transmitted in social
networks. At the same time, it also suggests that if other villagers’ decisions can be
revealed in complement to the performance of the network, it can have a large impact
on adoption decisions.
Under what circumstances can social networks diffuse information more effec-
tively? Existing studies suggest that the magnitude of social network effects depends
on the social structure (Galeotti et al. (2010); Jackson and Yariv (2010); Banerjee
et al. (2012)). By exploiting variations in household level network characteristics, we
show that the network effect is larger when participants in the first round intensive
information session are more central in the village network. We also find that house-
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holds which are less frequently named as friends by other people, less easily reached
by others, or less important in the network are more likely to be influenced by other
people.
This paper contributes to the social network literature on two fronts.1 First,
estimating the causal effect of social networks is challenging due to the problem of
correlated unobservables such as social norms and homophily (Manski (1993)). To
overcome this difficulty, both experimental and non-experimental approaches have
been used.2 Results vary greatly with both the product and the context considered.
This paper is the first to use randomized experimental methods to estimate the causal
effect of social networks on weather insurance purchase decisions and to estimate the
monetary equivalence of this effect.
Second, as its main contribution, the paper provides evidence on the mechanisms
through which social networks affect behavior. While the study of social network
mechanisms is crucial from both theoretical and policy perspectives, only a few stud-
ies to date have shed light on this. For example, Kremer and Miguel (2007) find
negative peer effects on the uptake of deworming pills, which effectively rules out
explanations such as imitation and learning how to use the product. Banerjee et al.
(2012), based on the estimation of a structural model, find that acquiring information
from friends is the most important channel to decide on microfinance participation.
By contrast, Maertens (2012) uses a survey design to study the adoption of Bt cot-
ton and finds that both acquiring knowledge from others about product profitability
and imitating others’ behavior contribute to individual adoption rates. This paper
extends the existing literature by using an experimental design to directly identify a
comprehensive set of generic channels through which social networks operate.
In addition to furthering our understanding of social networks, this paper adds
1Existing studies have linked social networks to a wide range of activities, including risk sharing
(Ambrus et al. (2010)), political outcomes (Galeotti and Mattozzi (2011)), labor market and job
satisfaction (Beaman (2011); Fogli and Veldkamp (2011); Pistaferri (1999); Munshi (2012); Card et
al. (2012)), building trust (Karlan et al. (2009)), financial decision-making (Duflo and Saez (2003);
Hong et al. (2004); Banerjee et al. (2012)), technology adoption (Conley and Udry (2010); Goolsbee
and Klenow (2002); Henkel and Maurer (2010); Maertens (2012)), criminal behavior (Bayer et
al. (2009); Glaeser et al. (1996)), productivity (Bandiera et al. (2010); Mas and Moretti (2009),
Waldinger (2012)), international trade (Chaney (2011)) and skill accumulation (Mookherjee et al.
(2010)). For a comprehensive review, see Jackson (2010).
2Experimental approaches were used by Duflo and Saez (2003), Dupas (2010), Kling et al. (2007),
and Oster and Thornton (Forthcoming), etc. Non-experimental methods were used notably by
Arcidiacono and Nicholson (2005), Bandiera and Rasul (2006), Bertrand et al. (2000), Conley and
Udry (2010), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995), and Imberman et al. (2012).
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insight to the literature on financial education. Although correlational evidence indi-
cates that individuals with low levels of financial literacy are less likely to participate
in financial markets (Lusardi and Mitchell (2007); Stango and Zinman (2009)), ex-
perimental research on the value of financial education provides mixed results. For
example, Duflo and Saez (2003) and Cole et al. (2011) find small or no effects of
financial education on individual decisions. By contrast, Cai and Song (2012) and
Gaurav et al. (2011) find positive and significant effects. In a context where insur-
ance is new, and farmers have low levels of formal education, our results show that
lack of knowledge of insurance is a major constraint on the demand for insurance,
and that improving farmers’ understanding of insurance products can significantly
improve take-up rates.
Finally, from a policy perspective, our paper sheds light on the challenge of how
to improve weather insurance take-up. This type of insurance is important for farm
households, whose production is exposed to substantial weather shocks.3 Yet evidence
from several countries shows that participation rates are low, even with heavy govern-
ment subsidies.4 Existing research has tested possible explanations for low take-up
such as lack of trust, credit constraints, or ambiguity aversion (Giné et al. (2008); Cole
et al. (2011); Bryan (2010)), but insurance demand remains low even after some of
these barriers were removed in experimental treatments. We provide evidence on the
role of scalable instruments in improving adoption, such as combining intensive insur-
ance knowledge provision to a subset of households with reliance on social networks
to amplify the effect and boost uptake rates, and combining subsidy or marketing
strategies with social norms marketing in which information is disseminated to the
full population about the behavior of peers.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background
for the study and the insurance contract. Section 3 explains the experimental design.
3Formal insurance markets are important because informal insurance mechanisms cannot effec-
tively reduce the negative impacts of regional weather shocks, and leave consumption susceptible
to covariate shocks (Townsend (1994)). The absence of insurance markets can lead to highly vari-
able household income and persistent poverty (Dercon and Christiaensen (2011); Jensen (2000);
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993)).
4For example, Cole et al. (2011) find an adoption rate of only 5%-10% for a similar insurance
policy in two regions of India in 2006.
5Field experiments have shown that social norms marketing, which tries to exploit people’s ten-
dency to imitate peers, has mixed effects on decision-making (Beshears et al. (2011); Cai et al.
(2009); Carrell et al. (2011); Frey and Meier (2004); and Fellner et al. (2011)). However, there is
little evidence on how social norms marketing may affect choices in products such as insurance.
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Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Background
Rice is the most important food crop in China, with nearly 50% of the country’s
farmers engaged in its production. In order to maintain food security and shield
farmers from negative weather shocks, in 2009 the Chinese government requested
the People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC) to design and offer the first rice
production insurance policy to rural households in 31 pilot counties.6 The program
was expanded to 62 counties in 2010 and to 99 in 2011. The experimental sites for
this study were 185 randomly selected rice production villages included in the 2010
expansion of the insurance program, located in Jiangxi province, one of China’s major
rice bowls. In these villages, rice production is the main source of income for most
farmers. Because the product was new, farmers, and even local government officials
at the town or village level, had very limited understanding of weather insurance
products.
The insurance contract is as follows. The actuarially fair price is 12 RMB per mu
per season.7 The government gives a 70% subsidy on the premium, so farmers only
pay the remaining 3.6 RMB per mu.8 Such governmental subsidies for agricultural
insurance are common in both China and other countries. If a farmer decides to buy
the insurance, the premium is deducted from the rice production subsidy deposited
annually in each farmer’s bank account, with no cash payment needed.9 The insurance
covers natural disasters, including heavy rain, flood, windstorm, extremely high or
low temperatures, and drought. If any of these natural disasters occurs and leads to
a 30% or more loss in yield, farmers are eligible to receive payouts from the insurance
company. The amount of the payout increases linearly with the loss rate in yield,
from 60 RMB per mu for a 30% loss to a maximum payout of 200 RMB per mu for a
total loss. The loss rate in yield is determined by a committee composed of insurance
6Before 2009, if disasters occurred, the government made payments to households whose produc-
tion had been seriously hurt. However, the level of transfer was usually very low.
71 RMB = 0.15 USD; 1 mu = 0.067 hectare
8According to our price experiment, the take-up rate is close to zero when the post-subsidy price
is larger than 8 RMB. As a result, subsidies were essential to do the network study as otherwise the
extremely low take-up rate would have made the analysis difficult.
9Starting in 2004, the Chinese government has provided production subsidies to rice farmers in
order to give them more production incentives.
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agents and agricultural experts. Since the average gross income from cultivating
rice in the experimental sites is between 700 RMB and 800 RMB per mu, and the
production cost is around 300 RMB to 400 RMB per mu, this insurance policy covers
25 to 30% of the gross income or 50 to 70% of the production cost.
3 Experimental Design and Data
3.1 Experimental Design
In rural China, standard methods to introduce and promote policy reforms (in recent
years, notable reforms concerned production subsidies, health insurance, and pen-
sions) include holding village meetings to announce and explain the policy and pub-
lishing individual villagers’ purchase information and outcomes, such as the payouts
for health insurance.10 We combined some of these methods to design a randomized
control experiment that could identify the role and functioning of social networks in
influencing insurance demand. The experiment was carried out in the Spring of 2010,
and includes 185 villages with a total of 5,332 households.11
The experiment assumes that improving farmers’ understanding of insurance prod-
ucts reinforces insurance take-up, a fact that we verify later. In order to generate
household level variation in the knowledge and understanding of insurance products,
two types of information sessions were offered to different households: simple sessions
that took around 20 minutes, during which the PICC agents introduced the insurance
contract;12 and intensive sessions that took around 45 minutes and covered all infor-
mation provided during simple sessions plus an education about insurance products
to help farmers understand how insurance works and what are its expected benefits.13
In each village, two rounds of sessions were offered to introduce the insurance
10These actions have been used not only to induce support for policy reforms, but also to confirm
farmers’ responses and to let them monitor the fairness of policy implementation.
11In this experiment, "villages" refers to the "natural villages" in rural China, which is a smaller
unit (30-40 households) than "administrative villages." (5-10 natural villages)
12The simple session explains the contract including the insurance premium, the amount of gov-
ernment subsidy, the responsibility of the insurance company, the maximum payout, the period of
responsibility, rules of loss verification, and the procedures for making payouts.
13Some of the topics included in the insurance education are: How does the insurance program
differ from a government subsidy? How much payout can you get under different conditions? What
is the expected benefit or loss from purchasing insurance for five continuous years depending on
different disaster frequencies and levels?
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program. During each round, there were two sessions held simultaneously, one simple
and one intensive. To allow time for information sharing by first round participants,
we held the second round sessions three days after the first round. The effect of
social networks on insurance take-up is identified by looking at whether second round
participants are more likely to buy insurance if they have more friends who were
invited to first round intensive sessions. The delay between the two sessions has been
chosen to be both sufficiently long that friends have time to communicate among
themselves, and yet not long enough that all the information from the first round
sessions has diffused across the whole population through indirect links.
The experimental design is illustrated in Figures 1.1 and 1.2. There are four
randomizations in this experiment, two at the household level and two at the village
level. The within-village household level randomizations are presented in Figure 1.1.
First, households in the sample were randomly assigned to one of the four sessions:
first round simple (T1), first round intensive (T2), second round simple (T3), or
second round intensive (T4).14 This randomization accounts for exogenous variations
among second round participants in the proportion of their group of friends exposed
to first round intensive sessions, and hence helps identify the causal effect of social
networks within villages.
Second, for each second round session, after the presentation and before partici-
pants were asked to make their final decisions, we randomly divided them into three
groups and disseminated additional information that was different for each group.
Specifically, farmers in groups U1 and U4 received no additional information from
us but were directly asked to make take-up decisions; these farmers thus received
exactly the same information from us as those in the two first round sessions (T1
and T2). For farmers in groups U2 and U5, we told them the overall attendance and
take-up rate at the two first round sessions in their village. For farmers in groups U3
and U6, we showed them the detailed list of purchase decisions made in the two first
round sessions, so that they knew specifically who had purchased the insurance and
who had not. This part of the experiment was designed to help determine the main
14For all household-level randomizations, we stratified the sample according to household size
and area of rice production per capita, and randomly assigned households to different treatment
groups in each stratum. Only household heads were invited to attend one of the four sessions. No
one could attend more than one session. In order to guarantee a high session attendance rate, we
gave monetary incentives to village leaders and asked them to inform and invite household heads to
attend these sessions.
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mechanisms that drive the social network effect.
In this experiment, we chose to randomize the information treatment within village
in order to test for network mechanisms. Since this is a within village measure,
it captures the effect of friends net of the potential general diffusion in the village
population, rather than the full spillover effect of the first round sessions.15
The village level randomizations are shown in Figure 1.2. First, we randomly
divided villages into two types. In type I villages, all households face the same price
of 3.6 RMB per mu. By contrast, in type II villages, we randomly assigned one of
seven different prices ranging from 1.8 to 7.2 RMB per mu to different participants.16
The price randomization in Type II villages allows us to measure the monetary value
of the social network effect. The second village-level randomization was only within
type I villages. We randomized the default option to buy in first round sessions.
If the default was BUY, the farmer needed to sign off if he or she did not want to
purchase the insurance; if the default was NOT BUY, the farmer had to sign on if
he or she decided to buy the insurance.17 Both groups otherwise received exactly the
same pitch for the product. Default options were the same in the two first round
sessions within each village. The objective of offering different default options was
to generate exogenous variations in the first round insurance take-up across villages
which could be used in some estimations as an instrumental variable for first round
purchase decisions.18
In all cases, households had to decide whether to purchase the insurance individ-
15We conducted another experiment to estimate the full spillover, with a standard cluster design
on 52 villages, with control villages and control households within treatment villages. Although the
information sessions are not fully comparable to this experiment, we will compare the two results
later in section 4.1.
16In all type II villages, farmers in second round sessions T3 and T4 received exactly the same
information as households in first round sessions T1 and T2, respectively. No additional first round
take-up information was provided after the presentation.
17During sessions where default = BUY, before farmers make decisions, instructors told them the
following: "We think that this is a very good insurance product, and we believe that most farmers
will choose to buy it. If you have decided to buy the insurance, there is nothing you need to do, as
the premium will be deducted automatically from your agricultural card; if you do not want to buy
it, then please come here and sign." During sessions where default = NOT BUY, farmers were told:
"We think that this is a very good insurance product, and we believe that most farmers will choose
to buy it. If you have decided to buy the insurance, please come here and sign, then the premium
will be deducted from your agricultural card; if you do not want to buy it, there’s nothing you need
to do."
18According to Beshears et al. (2010), default options can influence pension decisions significantly.
A fuller discussion of reasons for compliance is provided in Section 4.3.2.
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ually at the end of the information session.
3.2 Data, Summary Statistics, and Randomization Check
The empirical analysis is based on data obtained from two surveys: a social net-
work survey which was carried out before the experiment, and a household survey
filled out after households made their insurance purchase decision. All rice-producing
households were invited to one of the sessions, and more than 90% of them attended.
Consequently, this provided us with a detailed census of the population of these 185
villages. In total, 5,332 households were surveyed.
The household survey includes questions on demographics, rice production, in-
come, borrowing experience, natural disasters experienced and losses incurred, ex-
perience in purchasing any kind of insurance, risk attitudes, and perceptions about
future disasters.19 It also contains questions that test farmers’ understanding of how
insurance works and its potential benefits. Those questions are based on materials
presented in the intensive information session, in order to help us test one important
mechanism of social network effect: the diffusion of knowledge about insurance. The
summary statistics of selected household characteristics are presented in Panel A of
Table 1: household heads are almost exclusively male, and the average education falls
between a primary and secondary school level; rice production is the main source of
household income, accounting for 73% of total income on average; 63% of the house-
holds had experienced some types of natural disaster in the most recent year, and the
average yield loss rate was around 28%; sample households are risk averse, with an
average risk aversion of 0.71 on a scale of zero (risk loving) to one (risk averse).
The social network survey asks the household head to list five close friends, either
within or outside the village, with whom he/she most frequently discusses rice pro-
duction or financially-related issues.20 The respondent is asked to rank these friends
based on which one would be consulted first, second, etc. Questions on relationships
with each person named, commonly discussed topics, and contact frequency are also
19Risk attitudes were elicited by asking sample households to choose between a certain amount
with increasing values of 50, 80, 100, 120, and 150 RMB (riskless option A), and risky gambles of
(200RMB, 0) with probability (0.5, 0.5) (risky option B). The proportion of riskless options chosen
by a household was then used as a measure of risk aversion, which ranges from 0 to 1. The perceived
probability of future disasters was elicited by asking, "What do you think is the probability of a
disaster that leads to more than 30% loss in yield next year?"
20Respondents can list any person except for their parents and children, because in many cases
parents and children cultivate the same plots of rice together.
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included in the survey. We chose to impose a fixed number of friends, so as to create
an exogenous variable with the number or share of these friends that were assigned
to the first round intensive information session. The drawback of this specification
is that the network characterization maybe incomplete. This concern is mitigated by
the experience of the pilot test with two villages, where most farmers named four or
five friends (82% five, 14% four, and 4% others) when the number was not limited.
Having the village network census, we can characterize each village’s social network.
We use these data to construct two types of variables: social network measures (Panel
B in Table 1) and social network structural characteristics (Panel C in Table 1).
We use three types of household-level social network measures. The general mea-
sure is defined as the number of socially-linked households invited to a first round
intensive session, divided by five, the household’s network size. Household A is said
to be socially linked to B if A named B or B named A in the social network survey.21
As can be seen in Panel B of Table 1, most households listed five friends (average
4.9). The general measure of social network varies between 0 and 1, with an average
of 0.16. We construct two other social network variables based on the strength of
the link between households (Granovetter (1973)). The strong measure is defined
as the number of bilaterally-linked households invited to a first round intensive ses-
sion, divided by network size. Household A and B are defined as bilaterally linked
if they named each other as friends. The weak measure is defined as the number of
second-order linked households invited to a first round intensive session, divided by
the sum of friends’ network sizes (25 in most cases). A second-order linked household
is one that is named as a friend by a given household’s friends. These three measures
represent the main independent variables used to estimate the social network effect.
We also construct indicators of the household-level network characteristics, with
the idea that these network features may provide sources of heterogeneity of the net-
work effect on insurance adoption. We retain three indicators for the importance
of a given household in a network: (i) in-degree, which is the number of persons
that named it as friend;22 (ii) path length, which is the mean of the shortest paths
to/from this household from/to any other household; and (iii) Eigenvector centrality,
21As in Banerjee et al. (2012), we consider an undirected graph for most estimations in the paper.
This seems appropriate for information which can flow in either direction as long as one farmer
communicates with the other frequently.
22Only the in-degree measure is considered here because the out-degree measure is defined as
network size, which equals five for most households.
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which measures a household’s importance in the overall flow of information. This last
indicator is a recursively-defined concept where each household’s centrality is propor-
tional to the sum of its neighbors’ centrality.23 Average values for these variables are
reported in Panel C of Table 1. Each household is on average cited as a friend by
three other households. The average path-length is around 2.5, which means that a
household can be connected to any other in the village by passing through two to three
households, on average. These relatively short average paths reflect the intensity of
network links in these small villages.
Randomization checks are presented in Appendix A, Tables A1 and A2. Household
characteristics and session participation rates are balanced across the four different
sessions. To check whether the price randomization is valid, we regress the five main
household characteristics (gender, age, household size, education, and area of rice
production) on the insurance price as well as a set of village fixed effects, in type II
villages where price variation was implemented:
Xij = α0 + α1Priceij + ηj + ij, (1)
where Xij represents a set of characteristic of household i in village j, including
gender, age, household size, education, and area of rice production. Priceij is the
price at which the household was offered the insurance, and ηj represents village fixed
effects. Results show that all the coefficient estimates are small in magnitude and
none is statistically significant, suggesting that the price randomization is valid.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Social Network Effect on Insurance Adoption
In this section, we present the results for the estimation of the social network effect
on farmers’ insurance purchase decisions. The average insurance take-up rates in
different information sessions are reported in Table 1, Panel D. They show that,
23While measures such as degree are intuitive notions of graphical importance, they miss the key
feature that a node’s ability to propagate information through a graph depends not only on the
sheer number of connections it has, but also on how important these connections are, which can be
captured by the centrality measure. For example, one person that would be the only intermediary
between two very interconnected subnetworks would have a very high centrality while only two
connections (Figure A1(b)).
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while the difference between the two first round sessions is substantial, there is a much
smaller difference between the two second round sessions. Moreover, the take-up rate
of second round sessions is much higher than that of first round simple sessions. This
finding suggests that the knowledge about insurance products provided at first round
intensive sessions improved farmers’ take-up rates, and that, during the three days
between the two rounds, there was substantial information diffusion from first round
to second round participants.
We estimate the effect of social networks on insurance take-up, using the type
I villages in which there was no price variation in the insurance offer (Figure 1.2).
We first establish the effect of the intensive session using the sample of first round
participants by estimating:
Takeupij = β0 + β1Intensiveij + β2Xij + ηj + ij, (2)
where Takeupij is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the household
decided to buy the insurance and zero otherwise. Intensiveij is a dummy variable
equal to one if the household was invited to an intensive session in village j and zero
otherwise. Xij includes household characteristics such as gender, age, education of
the household head, rice production area, etc., and ηj are village fixed effects. Results
in Table 2 (Column (1)) show that the take-up rate in first round intensive sessions
is 14 percentage points higher than in simple sessions (at 35%),24 suggesting a large
and significantly positive intensive session effect that increases the take-up rate by
43% in the first round.25
We next estimate the social network effect on insurance take-up, i.e., the spillover
effect of first round intensive sessions on second round participants. To do so, we focus
on the sample of households assigned to second round groups U1 and U4 (where no
first round take-up information was revealed).26 We test whether participants are
24 We show the heterogeneity of the intensive session effect in Table A3. Better educated farmers
are more influenced by attending the intensive session (Column (2)). The reason could be that well
educated farmers can learn better and more rapidly.
25There are several reasons why attending an intensive session may increase insurance take-up,
such as improving farmers’ understanding of the product, trust in the program, etc. We show in
section 4.3.1 that participating in an intensive session significantly improves farmers’ understanding
of how insurance works and the benefits of such products. We tested farmers’ trust in this program
but did not find a significant effect of attending an intensive session on it. This suggests that the
intensive session works mainly through improving farmers’ insurance knowledge rather than through
a trust channel.
26Only second round groups U1 and U4 are included in the estimation of social network effects
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more likely to buy insurance if they have more friends who were invited to the first
round intensive session by estimating:
Takeupij = τ0 + τ1Networkij + τ2Xij + ηj + ij, (3)
where Networkij is defined as the fraction of the group of friends named by a house-
hold in the social network survey who have been invited to a first round intensive
session.27 Because households are more likely to be exposed to information provided
during intensive sessions if more of their friends were invited to an intensive session,
we expect a positive social network effect.
Estimation results are reported in Table 2. Results in Column (2) indicate a
significantly positive effect of social networks on insurance take-up, with a magnitude
of 33.7 percentage points. This finding suggests that having one additional close
friend attend a first round intensive session - raising the general network measure
by 20% - increases a farmer’s own take-up rate by 33.7 ∗ 0.2 = 6.74 percentage
points. This effect is equivalent to more than 45% of the impact of attending an
intensive session directly (Column (1)). The result is robust to the addition of control
variables (Column (3)).28 Note that correlations with control variables are interesting
in themselves: older farmers, farmers with a larger production area, or those with
more education are more likely to buy the insurance. Households who are more risk
averse or those who predict a higher probability of natural disasters in the following
year, are also more likely to purchase insurance. We test whether the magnitude
of the social network effect depends on whether a farmer directly participated in an
intensive session. The results in Column (4) show that the social network effect is
smaller in second round intensive sessions, indicating that people are less influenced
by their friends when they have direct education about the insurance products.
As we noted above, we are measuring spillover effects of the first round intensive
sessions through friends, rather than the spillover effects through all villagers. We
because those are the participants who received exactly the same treatment as first round sessions
T1 and T2.
27For example, if a household listed five friends, and two of them were invited to a first round
intensive session, then the social network measure equals 0.4.
28Because a small proportion of households named fewer than 5 friends in the social network
survey, and these households might be different from other farmers in some aspects, we conduct a
robustness check by excluding these households and find that the magnitude and significance of the
social network effect remain almost the same.
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test for the presence of spillover effects through non-friends by comparing the take-
up of second-round participants with no friends in the first round intensive session
with the take-up of first round participants. Results shown in Column (5) suggest
no difference in take-up by participants in simple sessions (coefficient of 0.019, not
significant), nor in intensive sessions (0.019-0.0478=-0.029, not significant). This
network effect we measured is also comparable to the overall network effect measured
in another experiment with a standard cluster randomization design.29
We next examine alternative measures of social network and a non-linear speci-
fication of the role of the network size. First, we re-estimate equation (3) using the
strong measure (bilateral links) and the weak measure (second-order links) of social
networks. Results are reported in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, respectively. The
result suggests that having one additional strongly linked friend attending first round
intensive session improves a farmer’s probability of taking the insurance policy by
8.5 percentage points, which is larger than the effect of the standard social links (6.7
percentage points). By contrast, friends with weak links are much less influential
(Column (2)). This means that households are not significantly influenced by their
friends’ friends during a short period of time (three days in this case). Second, we test
for a non-linear effect of social networks on take-up in Column (3). Among second
round participants, having two friends invited to a first round intensive session in-
creases the take-up rate by 20.6 percentage points; this is about 14 percentage points
higher than the 6.2 percentage points effect of having only one friend invited to a
first round intensive session. However, having more than two friends invited to an
intensive session has only a slightly higher effect on take-up (7 percentage points)
than having two.
In summary, these results indicate that offering intensive information session about
insurance products when introducing the product improves take-up significantly. Im-
portantly, it has a large and significant spillover effect on insurance adoption by other
29The design of this other experiment was as follows: From a sample of 52 villages, we randomly
selected 30 treatment villages within which we randomly invited a subset of households (group A) to
attend an information session about the insurance program. The content of the information session
was intermediate between those of the simple and intensive sessions of this experiment. Three days
after the session, we visited the remaining households (group B) individually. In control villages,
all households (group C) were visited individually. We then measured the social network effect by
comparing uptakes in groups B and C. Having one additional listed friend attending the information
session increases one’s own take-up by 4%, which equates to around 33% of the direct session effect.
Although the design is not fully comparable to this experiment, the order of magnitude of the
network effect is similar.
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farmers: among second round participants, having one more friend invited to a first
round intensive session transmits 45% of the first order session effect.
4.2 Monetary Equivalence of the Social Network Effect
In this section, we assess the importance of the social network effect by measuring
its price equivalence through price randomization in type II villages (Figure 1.2).
Specifically, we estimate whether households are less sensitive to price if they have
more friends invited to an intensive session. We then use estimated coefficients to
calculate the monetary equivalence of the social network effect, i.e., the amount by
which the premium should be reduced in order to achieve the same effect on insurance
take-up as the social network.30
In Figure 2, we compare the insurance demand curves of households with an above-
median (high) or below-median (low) proportion of friends in first round intensive
sessions. The insurance demand curve is clearly higher and flatter, especially under
high prices, when a relatively high proportion of friends has been invited to intensive
sessions. We estimate this relationship with the following equation:
Takeupij = γ0 + γ1Priceij + γ2Networkij
+ γ3Priceij ∗Networkij + γ4Xij + ηj + ij, (4)
where Priceij is the price assigned to household i in village j, which takes one of
seven different values ranging from 1.8 to 7.2 RMB per mu. The results presented in
Table 4 show that increasing the price by 1RMB decreases take-up by 11.2 percentage
points (Column (1)). The interaction term between price and social network is signifi-
cantly positive (Column (2)), suggesting that households with more friends invited to
intensive sessions are less sensitive to price. Specifically, having one additional friend
invited to an intensive session mitigates the price effect by 0.13 ∗ 0.2/0.167 = 16%.
A concern with this estimation is that, for households in the price experiment,
some friends face lower prices than they do, while others face higher prices. A "fair-
ness" concern may thus occur and affect the price elasticity of insurance demand. To
control for the potential impact of a perceived lack of fairness in pricing, we include
two additional variables when estimating equation 4: the share of friends with prices
30A simple theoretical model is presented in appendix B that explains why social networks can
potentially influence both the level and the slope of the insurance demand curve.
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higher or lower than one’s own price. Results in Column (3) show only a slight change
when controlling for fairness.
We can now calculate the price equivalence P of the social network effect using
the following formula:
P =
γˆ2 + γˆ3 ∗mean(Price)
γˆ1 + γˆ3 ∗mean(Network) ∗ 0.2
Using estimated coefficients from Columns (2) and (3), and the average values of
Network (0.161) and Price (4.34) in these villages, we find that having one additional
friend is equivalent to a 15% decrease in the average insurance premium. This is a
large effect, showing the importance of social networks in individual financial decision-
making.
4.3 Identifying the Social Network Effect Mechanisms
A natural question to ask is why do social networks matter. What is it that farm-
ers have learned from their informed friends that influenced their take-up decisions?
Generally speaking, social networks may influence the adoption of a new technology
or a financial product because of three reasons: (i) people gain knowledge from their
friends about the value or the benefits of a product (Conley and Udry (2010); Kremer
and Miguel (2007); Koher et al. (2001)); (ii) people learn from their friends how to
use the product (Munshi and Myaux (2006); Kremer and Miguel (2007); Oster and
Thornton (Forthcoming)); or (iii) individuals are influenced by other people’s deci-
sions (Bandiera and Rasul (2006); Banerjee (1992); Beshears et al. (2011); Bursztyn
et al. (2012);31 Çelen et al. (2010); Ellison and Fudenberg (1993); Rogers (1995)).
In this last case, farmers could be influenced by their friends’ decisions because of
scale effects (farmers believe that they have greater leverage over the insurance com-
pany if more of them purchase the product together), a desire to imitate (farmers
want to act like each other), or the existence of informal risk-sharing arrangements
(a farmer’s decision depends on the purchase decision of households from whom the
farmer borrows or to whom he lends (Bloch et al. (2008)).
With insurance, there is little to learn in terms of "how to use the product".
31There are different reasons of why people are influenced by friends’ decisions. While this is
not the focus of our paper, Bursztyn et al. (2012) uses a very nice experimental design to separate
between social learning and social utility effects.
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We thus focus on the role of the other two types of information that can be usefully
conveyed by social networks, insurance knowledge and purchase decisions, and explore
each of them in turn. Specifically, if the reason why farmers are affected by their
friends’ exposure to the intensive session is that their understanding of insurance
benefits is improved by learning from them, this means that insufficient knowledge
of insurance impairs adoption; in that case, providing more information about the
insurance product would be crucial. On the other hand, if the network effect is
driven by the influence of friends’ purchase decisions, then using marketing strategies
to guarantee a high adoption rate by pilot clients could significantly improve the
take-up rate by follow-up customers.
4.3.1 Role of social networks in diffusing knowledge of insurance
To test the insurance knowledge mechanism, we follow two approaches. The first
consists of comparing the magnitude of the intensive session effect on post-session
insurance knowledge test scores, between the first round (simple session T1 vs. in-
tensive session T2) and second round sessions (simple session U1 vs. intensive session
U4).32 Intuitively, if second round participants can acquire sufficient insurance knowl-
edge from first round participants during the time interval between the two rounds,
then second round intensive session should make no difference relative to the simple
session on either take-up or post-session knowledge of insurance. The estimation is
as follows:
Knowledgeij = ω0 + ω1Intensiveij + ω2Secij + ω3Intensiveij ∗ Secij + ij (5)
where Secij is a dummy variable indicating whether the household was assigned to
one of the two second-round sessions, and Knowledgeij is a measure of insurance
knowledge, which is defined as the score that a household obtained on a ten-question
insurance knowledge test.
The results presented in Table 5, Column (1), show that, while participating
in intensive session raises the insurance knowledge test score significantly in the first
round (by 31 percentage points), it has a much smaller effect in second round sessions.
Specifically, being invited to a second round intensive session improves insurance
32This is because only U1 and U4 received exactly the same treatment as T1 and T2 and are thus
comparable with each other.
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knowledge by farmers with no friends attending first round intensive session, but it
has no effect on farmers who have at least one friend assigned to first round intensive
session (Column (2)). As a result, intensive sessions in the second round improve
insurance knowledge only for those farmers with no friends in first round intensive
sessions.
The second approach tests whether households perform better on the insurance
knowledge test when they had more friends invited to first round intensive sessions,
by estimating the following equation:
Knowledgeij = λ0 + λ1Networkij + λ2Xij + ηj + ij (6)
Results in Column (3) show that having one additional friend assigned to a first round
intensive session improves the level of insurance knowledge by 6 percentage points
(the mean of baseline knowledge score equals 0.25). Furthermore, we test whether
this effect is larger when one’s friend better understands the materials provided during
the intensive session, and as a result can better teach other people, by estimating:
Knowledgeij = λ0 + λ1Networkij + λ2NetKnowledgeij
+ λ3Networkij ∗NetKnowledgeij + λ4Xij + ηj + ij (7)
where NetKnowledgeij is the average insurance knowledge test score received by
household i’s friends in the first round intensive session in village j. The results from
this estimation (Column (4)) show that a farmer learns more from friends who demon-
strate a better understanding of the information provided at the intensive session.
4.3.2 Role of social networks in diffusing purchase decisions
To understand whether social networks affect adoption by conveying information on
participants’ purchase decisions, we directly test the effect of other people’s decisions
on insurance take-up. To do so, we first look at the role of the overall take-up rate in
first round sessions in influencing second round participants’ behavior. We then look
at the role of friends’ take-up rate in first round sessions. Consider first the effect of
the overall first round take-up rate:
Takeupij = γ0 + γ1TakeupRatej + γ2Infoij + γ3TakeupRatej ∗ Infoij + ij (8)
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where TakeupRatej is the overall take-up rate in first round sessions (T1 and T2) in
village j and is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1. Infoij is an indicator of
whether we told second round participants about the overall first round take-up rate.
The hypothesis is that individuals are more likely to purchase insurance if they see
higher take-up rates in previous sessions, because of either scale effect or imitation.
However, OLS estimation cannot give a consistent estimation because unobservable
variables such as social norms may affect both TakeupRatej and Takeupij. As a
result, we use an instrumental variables approach as follows.
First, we see that randomized default options in first-round sessions yield signif-
icant and substantial variations in the overall first round take-up rates: the average
take-up rate of "default = BUY" sessions is around 12 percentage points higher than
that of "default = NOT BUY" sessions (Table 6, Column (1)).33 As a result, we can
use the default option as an IV for first-round overall take-up rates. OLS and IV
estimation results are presented in Columns (2) and (3). From these results, we find
that farmers are more likely to buy insurance when the overall first round take-up
rate is higher. However, this effect is much smaller if we did not explicitly reveal
purchase information, becoming not statistically significant in IV estimation.
To see this more clearly, we break down the sample and re-estimate the influence
of first round overall take-up rate (Columns (4) and (5)). We find that second round
participants are not influenced by decisions made by first round participants when
this information is not revealed to them (Column (4)). However, if we disseminate
first round overall take-up information during second round sessions, we find that a
10% higher take-up rate in the first session can raise the take-up rate in second-round
sessions by 4.3%.
We next analyze whether information about friends’ decisions has similar effects
33Reasons why people follow the default option have been discussed in Brown et al. (2011) and
Beshears et al. (2010), including the complexity of decisions, an endorsement effect (this is what
government suggests), a social effect (everyone else is doing it), and procrastination. We explain the
large default effect as follows in Table A4. First, we find that people are less likely to follow the
default option when they receive better information about the product: the default effect is smaller
in intensive sessions than in simple sessions (Column (1)). Second, the magnitude of the default
effect does not vary whether a farmer trusts the government more or less (Column (3)), which means
that the endorsement effect cannot be the main explanation here. Third, we asked farmers, "Do you
think that more than 50% of the households in your village will purchase this insurance?" (Yes or
No). The default option does not have a significant effect on the answer, and as a result rules out
the social effect explanation. These pieces of evidence together suggest that the main reason why
people follow the default option in our setting is that making the decision is too complex for them.
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on farmers’ decisions as information about the overall take-up rate. For this, we
estimate the following equation using the sample of second round participants who
did not receive take-up information and those who received from us the first-round
decision list (U1, U3, U4, and U6 in Figure 1.1):
Takeupij = δ0 + δ1TakeupRatej + δ2TakeupRateNetworkij + δ3Infoij
+ δ4TakeupRatej ∗ Infoij + δ5TakeupRateNetworkij ∗ Infoij + ij (9)
where TakeupRateNetworkij represents the take-up rate among friends of household
i who attended first-round sessions in village j. Similar to what has been discussed
before, both TakeupRatej and TakeupRateNetworkij are endogenous. While we still
use the first round default option as IV for the overall first round take-up rate, we use
Default times the ratio of network in first-round sessions (first round default options
are more likely to influence the number of friends who purchase insurance if more
friends are included in first round sessions) as an IV for TakeupRateNetworkij.
Results are presented in Table 7. These results show that decisions made by
friends in a farmer’s social network do not influence the farmer’s own decision (Col-
umn (4)). This is not because farmers do not care about other villagers’ decisions,
as this information has a large and significant influence if we explicitly revealed it
(Columns (5)), but because, at least in this context, social networks did not convey
this information. A qualitative analysis confirms this argument. In the household
survey, we directly asked people whether they knew each of their friends’ decisions.
Only 9% of the households responded that they knew at least one of their friends’
decisions. These results suggest an interesting regularity about the performance of
social networks in rural villages in our study: while networks are efficient in trans-
mitting knowledge, they do not generally convey information on purchase decisions.
This is surprising, because farmers actually care a great deal about that information,
as indicated by its significant effect on decision-making when explicitly revealed.
Direct interviews with farmers, as well as behavioral studies (Qian et al. (2007)),
provide a possible interpretation for this apparent contradiction. The villages in our
sample are likely characterized by a strongly ingrained cultural factor in traditional
environments which can explain the limited diffusion of information on take-up deci-
sions: Chinese people care a lot about "face" (i.e., their public image), and disclosing
purchase decisions carries the risk of "losing face." Specifically, farmers are reluctant
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to reveal their decisions because they are unsure of whether they have made the right
choice and do not want to expose their potential lack of judgment or be liable for
having influenced someone in making a bad decision. This interpretation is consis-
tent with the finding that 76% of those friends who revealed their decision are village
leaders or opinion leaders within the village. These people should be more confident
in their choices and as a result less worried about the risk of "losing face". Social
networks in Chinese villages are thus useful instruments for the diffusion of knowledge
from informed to uninformed individuals. However, these networks suffer from the
drawback that the deep-rooted concern with not losing face limits the circulation of
information on an essential determinant of decision-making, namely knowing what
peers have decided regarding adoption of the innovation.34
Based on the above results and discussion, we conclude that the observed short-
term social network effect on insurance take-up is mainly driven by the diffusion of
insurance knowledge, as opposed to the diffusion of information regarding others’ pur-
chase decisions that may influence decision-making through scale effects, imitation,
or informal risk-sharing.
4.4 Heterogeneity in Network Characteristics
Given that social networks can help improve insurance take-up by diffusing insurance
knowledge, are there particular individuals which are more effective as entry points to
receive intensive information about the product for the diffusion of information? This
will depend on both individual and village network characteristics (Jackson (2010);
Acemoglu et al. (2010); Allcott et al. (2007)). We examine the heterogeneity of
network effects across households by the following estimation:
Takeupij = η0 + η1Networkij + η2OwnCharactij + η3Networkij∗
OwnCharactij + η4NetCharactij + η5Networkij ∗NetCharactij + ij (10)
where OwnCharactij is the network characteristics of household i, and NetCharactij
represents the average network characteristics of friends named by household i who
attended the first round intensive session in village j. The strength of network in-
34It is unlikely that three days will be insufficient to convey purchasing decisions while it is
sufficient for knowledge information to diffuse. Preliminary results from a follow-up survey one year
later confirm that farmers are still not influenced by their friends’ decisions.
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fluence is given by: η1 + η3OwnCharactij + η5NetCharactij, which is a function of
both a farmer’s own characteristics and those of the farmer’s network. A natural
interpretation of this expression is that a farmer’s own characteristics measure how
likely the farmer is to be influenced conditional on his/her network characteristics,
while the characteristics of the network measure how much the network influences
the farmer conditional on his/her own characteristics.
A concern about the above estimation is that these characteristics are endogenous.
With this caveat in mind, results in Table 8 indicate that a farmer’s own character-
istics are important: those who were named more often by others (higher in-degree),
who can be reached more easily (smaller path length35), and who have a more impor-
tant network position (higher eigenvector centrality), are less likely to be influenced
by other people (as seen in interaction terms in Columns (2), (4) and (6)). These
characteristics not only affect the magnitude of the network effect, but also directly
affect the take-up. Those who were named more often by others, who can be reached
less easily, and who have a less important network position are more likely to buy
insurance (Column (7)).
Turning to the question of who are more influential, we see in Column (8) that,
even though the average in-degree and path length of one’s friends do not influence
the magnitude of the social network effect, their eigenvector centrality does. If the
eigenvector centrality of the set of friends in first round intensive session is one stan-
dard deviation larger (0.1), second round overall take-up is around 5 percentage points
larger, and the effect on take-up of social networks is around 6.8 percentage points
larger.
5 Conclusions
This paper uses a randomized field experiment conducted in China’s main rice pro-
ducing area to analyze the role of social networks in the adoption of a new weather
insurance product and the mechanisms through which networks operate. We find
that providing intensive information about how insurance works and the benefit of
the product to a subset of farmers has large and positive spillover effects on other
farmers. This spillover effect is driven by the diffusion of insurance knowledge through
social networks rather than the diffusion of information on behavior. While people
35The own path length means the average length of path for other farmers to reach me.
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care a great deal about whether others in their social network have decided to pur-
chase the new insurance product or not, this information is not conveyed through
social networks.
Several policy implications can be drawn from these results. First, our study
suggests that providing intensive information session about insurance to a subset of
farmers and relying on social networks to rapidly multiply its effect on others, can
be an effective strategy for increasing adoption of a new insurance product in similar
contexts. Targeting individuals who are more central in the village network for this
intervention can make a significant difference in the size of the multipliers achieved.
Second, our finding that farmers typically do not convey their purchase decisions to
others suggests that the common practice of providing heavy subsidies for innovative
products to a subset of potential customers in order to encourage take-up with the
hope that others will follow their behavior, may not be sufficient to achieve expected
outcomes. Consequently, combining either information or subsidies for a targeted sub-
population together with social norms marketing, which disseminates information
to the full population about the behavior of peers, may be an inexpensive way of
expanding the take-up rate for innovative products.
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Figure 1.2. Experimental Design: Village Level Randomization
Notes: Randomizations within T3 and T4 are only available in type I villages where there was no
price randomization. No additional first-round take-up information was offered to participants in
T3 and T4 in type II villages.
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Figure 2. Effect of Having Friends Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session on
Insurance Demand
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%Network financially educated = High
95% CI
Notes: This figure is based on the sample of households in type II villages where price
randomization was implemented. The variable %Network financially educated is defined as "high"
if a household has above median share of friends invited to 1st round intensive session and is
defined as "low" otherwise.
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Sample Mean Sample Std. Dev
PANEL A: HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Gender of Household Head (1 = Male, 0 = Female) 0.914 0.280
Age 51.494 12.032
Household Size 4.915 2.133
Education (0 = illiteracy, 1 = primary, 2 = secondary, 3 = high school, 4 = college) 1.192 0.853
Area of Rice Production (mu, 1 mu = 1/15 hectare) 12.635 19.921
Share of Rice Income in Total Income (%) 73.258 34.841
Any Disasters Happened Last Year (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.631 0.483
Loss in Yield Last Year (%) 27.507 18.199
Risk Aversion (0-1, 0 as risk loving and 1 as risk averse) 0.711 0.313
Perceived Probability of Future Disasters (%) 33.633 16.619
PANEL B: SOCIAL NETWORK MEASURES
Number of Friends Listed 4.893 0.510
General Measure: %Friends Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session 0.161 0.189
Strong Measure: %Mutually Listed Friends Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session 0.043 0.100
Weak Measure: %2nd order Friends Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session 0.154 0.114
PANEL C: SOCIAL NETWORK STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
In-Degree (Household level measure) 3.266 2.496
Path Length (Household level measure) 2.578 1.941
Eigenvector Centrality (Household level measure) 0.148 0.098
PANEL D: OUTCOME VARIABLE
Insurance Take-up Rate (%), all sample 44.084 49.654
Insurance Take-up Rate (%), 1st round simple session 35.218 47.787
Insurance Take-up Rate (%), 1st round intensive session 50.365 50.021
Insurance Take-up Rate (%), 2nd round simple session 44.178 49.678
Insurance Take-up Rate (%), 2nd round intensive session 45.972 49.856
No. of Households: 5332
No. of Villages: 185 
Table 1. Summary Statistics
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VARIABLES
Sample: 
1st round session 
participants
1st round (all) & 2nd 
round (U1 and U4, 
no friends in T2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intensive Information Session 0.140*** 0.00643 0.0539 0.1396***
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0259) (0.0329) (0.0397) (0.0258)
Network Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session 0.337*** 0.348*** 0.489***
([0, 1]) (0.0810) (0.0779) (0.105)
Network Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session -0.301*
            *Intensive Information Session (0.162)
Second round 0.019
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0367)
Intensive Information Session * Second Round -0.0478
(0.0472)
Male 0.0393 0.0374 0.0408 0.0454
(0.0476) (0.0673) (0.0672) (0.0414)
Age 0.00205* 0.00374*** 0.00384*** 0.0026***
(0.00108) (0.00123) (0.00122) (0.001)
Household Size -0.00381 -0.00878 -0.00901 -0.0047
(0.00514) (0.00677) (0.00674) (0.0049)
Rice Production Area (mu) 0.00161 0.00323*** 0.00330*** 0.0016*
(0.000993) (0.00115) (0.00114) (0.0009)
Literate (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.0821*** 0.0844*** 0.0841*** 0.0617***
(0.0269) (0.0320) (0.0319) (0.0222)
Risk Aversion ([0, 1]) 0.119** 0.114** 0.0793***
(0.0494) (0.0492) (0.03)
Perceived Probability of Disaster  ([0, 1]) 0.00211** 0.00208** 0.00013
(0.000819) (0.000819) (0.0006)
No. of Observations 2,137 1,274 1,255 1,255 2756
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.129 0.087 0.112 0.115 0.1067
Insurance Take-up (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Table 2. Effect of Social Networks (General Measure) on Insurance Take-up
Notes: Robust clustered (to village level)  standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) in this table is based on the sample of first round session 
participants (T1 and T2). Columns (2) to (4) in this table are based on the sample of participants in 2nd round sessions who did not receive 1st 
round take-up information from us (U1, U4) in type I villages. Social network is measured by the fraction of the five friends that a household 
listed who were assigned to a first round intensive session. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2nd round session participants in U1 
and U4
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VARIABLES
Nonlinear Effects
Sample: Second round session participants in U1 and U4 (1) (2) (3)
Network Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session  ([0, 1])
   - Strong social network 0.428**
(0.182)
   - Weak social network 0.0843
(0.149)
Number of Friends Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session
   - Equal to 1 0.0616*
(0.0319)
   - Equal to 2 0.206***
(0.0398)
   - Greater than 2 0.279*
(0.156)
No. of Observations 1,255 1,255 1,255
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.101 0.097 0.120
Insurance Take-up (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Table 3. Effect of Social Networks on Insurance Take-up:                                              
Alternative Measures and Functional Form
Strength of Ties
Notes: Robust clustered  (to village level) standard errors in parentheses.  Results in this table are based on the sample 
of participants in 2nd round sessions who did not receive 1st round take-up information from us (U1 and U4 in Figure 
1.1). Columns (1) and (2) report heterogenous effect of social networks depending on the strength of ties, where social 
network is measured in two ways: the strong social network is defined as the fraction of the five friends who were 
mutually listed and were assigned to the first round intensive session; the weak social network is defined as the 
fraction of second-order friends (friends' friends) who were assigned to the first round intensive session. P-value of 
significance in difference between Strong and Weak network effect equals 0.004 (significant at 1% level). Column (3) 
shows nonlinear effects of social networks. Household characteristics include gender, age and education of household 
head, household size, rice production area, risk aversion, and perceived probability of future disasters. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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VARIABLES
Sample: Second round participants in Type II villages (1) (2) (3)
Price -0.112*** -0.167*** -0.151***
(0.0162) (0.0273) (0.0306)
Network Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session ([0, 1]) 0.364*** -0.199 -0.241
(0.0979) (0.230) (0.243)
Price * Network Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session 0.130** 0.151**
(0.0524) (0.0520)
Share of Friends with Higher Prices ([0,1]) 0.0795
(0.101)
Share of Friends with Lower Prices ([0,1]) -0.0911
(0.0770)
No. of Observations 429 429 429
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.239 0.249 0.260
P-value of Joint-significance:  
Price 0.0000*** 0.0013***
Network Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session 0.0057*** 0.0018***
Table 4. Monetary Value of the Social Network Effect on Insurance Take-up
Insurance Take-up (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Notes: Robust clustered (to village level) standard errors in parentheses.  This table is based on the sample of second 
round participants in type II villages where different prices ranging from 1.8 RMB to 7.2 RMB were randomly assigned 
on the household level. Household characteristics include gender, age and education of household head, household size, 
production area, risk aversion, and perceived probability of future disasters. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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VARIABLES
Sample:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intensive Information Session 0.314*** 0.196*** 0.0731*** 0.0765***
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0120) (0.0223) (0.0167) (0.0165)
Second round 0.224***
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0143)
Intensive Information Session -0.25***
*Second Round (0.0200)
Having friends invited to 1st Round Intensive Session 0.189***
( 1= Yes, 0 = No) (0.022)
Intensive Information Session -0.229***
*Having friends invited to 1st Round Intensive Session (0.033)
Network Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session 0.30*** -0.01
([0, 1]) (0..048) (0.106)
Network Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session 0.415***
*Average Network Insurance Knowledge (0.127)
No. of Observations 3,259 1255 1,255 1,255
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.241 0.2735 0.1345 0.1324
P-value of Joint-significance:
Intensive Information Session 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Network Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session 0.0000***
Post-Session Insurance Knowledge Score ([0, 1])
Table 5. Did Social Networks Convey Insurance Knowledge?
Notes: Robust clustered (to village level) standard errors in parentheses. Estimation results in columns (1)and (2) are based 
on households who were assigned to first round sessions or those in second round session groups without additional 
information (T1, T2, U1, and U4 in Figure 1.1). Columns (3) and (4) are based on households who were invited to second 
round sessions but did not receive any additonal take-up information (U1 and U4 in Figure 1.1). Insurance knowledge is the 
score that a household got in ten questions that we asked during household survey to test their knowledge of insurance after 
taking the information session. The mean of insurance knowledge test score equals 0.254. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                                                                   
U1 and U4T1 T2 U1 U4
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First Stage: Overall 
1st Round Take-up
Sample: T1 and T2
No Information 
Revealed (U1 U4)
Revealed 1st Round 
Overall Take-up 
(U2 U3 U5 U6)
OLS IV IV IV
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Default (1 = Buy, 0 = Not Buy) 0.121***
(0.0326)
1st Round Overall Take-up Rate 0.387*** 0.370* -0.00290 0.427*
(0.0712) (0.223) (0.0856) (0.237)
No 1st Round Take-up Information Revealed 0.137*** 0.168
(0.0407) (0.133)
1st Round Overall Take-up Rate -0.316*** -0.389
*No 1st Round Take-up Information Revealed (0.0757) (0.314)
No. of Observations 2,137 2,674 2,674 1,296 1,296
Village Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.120 0.098 0.098 0.095 0.135
P-value of Joint-significance:                          
1st Round Overall Take-up Rate 0.0000*** 0.2159
T3 and T4
Second Stage: Insurance Take-up (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Notes: Robust clustered (to village level) standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) present first stage results for IV estimation. Estimations from 
columns (2) to (5) in this table are based on the sample of 2nd round session participants. Columns (2) and (3) are based on the whole 2nd round 
sample; Column (4) is based on the sub-sample who received no extra information in addition to the presentation (U1 and U4 in Figure 1.1); Column 
(5) is based on the subgroup of households to whom we desseminated the first round take-up information (U2, U3, U4 and U6 in Figure 1.1). In IV 
estimations, Default options are used as the instrumental variable for the first round overall take-up rate. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6.  Effect of the Overall 1st Round Take-up Rate on 2nd Round Take-up
First Stage: Network 
1st Round Take-up Rate
Sample: U1U3 U4 U6
No Information 
Revealed (U1 U4)
Revealed 1st 
Round Overall 
Take-up (U3 U6)
OLS IV IV IV
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st Round Overall Take-up Rate 0.610*** 0.436 0.0225 0.691
(0.108) (0.602) (1.452) (0.664)
1st Round Network's Take-up Rate -0.0174 0.555** -0.0891 0.589**
(0.0528) (0.274) (1.456) (0.280)
No Information Revealed 0.261*** 0.412**
(1 =Yes, 0 = No) (0.0555) (0.194)
1st Round Overall Take-up Rate -0.545*** -0.723
       * No Information Revealed (0.123) (1.181)
1st Round Network's Take-up Rate 0.0169 -0.0950
       * No Information Revealed (0.0730) (1.030)
Default 0.308***
       * Network in 1st Round Sessions (0.0593)
No. of Observation 1,643 1,643 1,643 983 660
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.163 0.089 0.074
P-value of Joint-significance:                      
1st Round Overall Take-up Rate 0.0000*** 0.7072
1st Round Network's Take-up Rate 0.9466 0.1248
Table 7. Effect of Friends' Decisions in 1st Round Sessions on 2nd Round Take-up
Second Stage: Insurance Take-up (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
U1 U3 U4 U6
Notes: Robust clustered (to village level) standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) - (3) are based on second round participants that received 
either no information or the decision list of first round sessions from us (U1, U3, U4 and U6 in Figure 1.1) . Column (4) is based on the sub-
sample with no additional information (U1 and U4 in Figure 1.1), while column (5) is based on households to whom we provided with the 
decision list of first round participants (U3 and U6 in Figure 1.1). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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VARIABLES
Sample: Second round participants in U1 and U4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Network Invited to 1st Round Intensive Session  0.316*** 0.544*** 0.419*** 0.834*** 0.165* 0.273 0.247** 0.462
([0, 1]) (0.101) (0.189) (0.107) (0.213) (0.0997) (0.171) (0.116) (0.335)
Intensive Information Session 0.00446 0.00821 0.0107 0.00926 0.00589 0.00908 0.00642 0.00613
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0331) (0.0330) (0.0331) (0.0328) (0.0329) (0.0328) (0.0331) (0.0327)
Heterogeneity Effects:
Own in-degree (mean = 3.266)
Direct effect 0.00874 0.0235*** 0.0207*** 0.0244**
(0.00566) (0.00885) (0.00772) (0.0119)
Interaction with Network -0.0860** -0.0218
(0.0397) (0.0466)
Average in-degree (mean = 3.266)
Direct effect 0.00409 0.00209 -0.0214** 0.00538
(0.00635) (0.00850) (0.00977) (0.0208)
Interaction with Network 0.0186 -0.0770
(0.0415) (0.0768)
Own Path Length (mean = 2.578)
Direct effect -0.0128* -0.00530 -0.0120* -0.00363
(0.00729) (0.00631) (0.00714) (0.00693)
Interaction with Network -0.0680** -0.0669**
(0.0284) (0.0333)
Average Path Length (mean = 2.578)
Direct effect -0.0150 -0.000249 -0.0155 -0.0284
(0.0124) (0.0177) (0.0129) (0.0267)
Interaction with Network -0.0666 0.165
(0.0995) (0.122)
Own Eigenvector Centrality (mean = 0.148)
Direct effect -0.0472 0.422* -0.497** 0.000288
(0.174) (0.235) (0.234) (0.335)
Interaction with Network -2.836*** -2.427*
(1.016) (1.418)
Average Eigenvector Centrality  (mean = 0.148)
Direct effect 0.492*** -0.0565 0.992*** 0.177
(0.157) (0.225) (0.244) (0.515)
Interaction with Network 3.232*** 3.416*
(0.948) (1.886)
No. of Observations 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255 1,255
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Squared 0.105 0.111 0.108 0.116 0.110 0.125 0.125 0.140
P-Value of Joint-significance: 
Network Attending 1st Round Intensive Session  0.01*** 0.0002*** 0.0003***
Network Structure (of friends) 0.669 0.6202 0.0001***
Network Structure (own) 0.0302** 0.0313** 0.0222**
Notes: Robust clustered (to village level) standard errors in parentheses.  Results in this table are based on the sample of participants in 2nd round sessions 
who did not receive 1st round take-up information from us (U1 and U4 in Figure 1.1). Social network is measured by the fraction of the five friends that a 
household listed who were assigned to a first round intensive session. See definitions of social network characteristics in text. Household characteristics 
include gender, age and education of household head, household size, rice production area, risk aversion, and perceived probability of future disasters. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Who is More Likely to be influenced and Who is More Influential?                                                                                                     
Table 8. Heterogeneity of the Social Network Effect:
Insurance Take-up (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
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Figure A1. Measure of Importance of a Household: In-Degree and Eigenvector
Centrality
Source: Breza et al. (2012), Figure 11
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P-Value
Simple Session Intensive Session Simple Session Intensive Session
Gender of Household Head (1 = Male, 0 = Female) 0.908 0.923 0.91 0.915 0.5982
(0.289) (0.266) (0.286) (0.279)
Age 51.489 51.091 51.724 51.592 0.6118
(11.879) (12.173) (12.227) (11.841)
Household Size 4.902 4.856 4.943 4.945 0.7084
(2.122) (2.094) (2.203) (2.103)
Education (0 = illiteracy, 1 = primary, 2 = secondary, 1.193 1.215 1.194 1.17 0.6471
3 = high school, 4 = college) (0.859) (0.85) (0.866) (0.839)
Area of Rice Production (mu) 12.965 12.965 11.978 12.247 0.6263
(15.25) (26.307) (14.397) (21.882)
Share of Rice Income in Total Income (%) 74.377 74.1 71.887 73.054 0.2812
(33.878) (33.553) (36.015) (35.414)
Any Disasters Happened Last Year (1 = Yes, 0 = No) 0.624 0.633 0.634 0.632 0.9627
(0.485) (0.482) (0.482) (0.483)
Loss in Yield Last Year (%) 27.042 27.683 27.601 27.651 0.9208
(18.498) (18.116) (18.374) (17.861)
Attendance Rate (%) 88.31 88.87 87.08 86.03 0.1114
(32.15) (31.47) (33.55) (34.68)
Number of Households 1079 1096 1587 1570 
Table A1. Randomization Check: Session Assignments
First Round Second Round
Note: This table checks the validity of the within-village session randomization. Standard deviations are in parentheses. P-values reported are for the F-test of 
equal means of the four session groups.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
OLS Coeff on Price
(1)
Gender of Household Head 0.0165
(1 = Male, 0 = Female) (0.0124)
Age 0.499
(0.339)
Household Size -0.0057
(0.0521)
Literate 0.0233
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.1796)
Area of Rice Production (mu) -0.0007
(0.0127)
Number of Households 431
Note: This table checks the validity of the price randomization. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table A2. Randomization Check: Price Randomization
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VARIABLES
Sample: First round session participants (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intensive Information Session 0.131 0.150*** 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.195***
(1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0962) (0.0346) (0.0328) (0.0303) (0.0574)
Heterogeneity Effects:
      Age 0.00196 0.00214** 0.00204* 0.00208* 0.00212**
(0.00142) (0.00106) (0.00109) (0.00107) (0.00107)
      Age*Intensive 0.000181
(0.00188)
      Education -0.0219
      (1 = Above average, 0 = Below average) (0.0479)
      Education*Intensive  0.0932***
(0.0341)
      Experience With Insurance 0.0249
      (1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0326)
      Experience*Intensive 0.0311
(0.0459)
      Risk Aversion ([0,1]) -0.0179
(0.0480)
      Risk Aversion*Intensive 0.0460
(0.0702)
      Day of Session (1-61) -0.0141
(0.0110)
      Day of Session*Intensive -0.00279
(0.00233)
Male 0.0394 0.0425 0.0386 0.0394 0.0341
(0.0477) (0.0471) (0.0473) (0.0476) (0.0477)
Household Size -0.00381 -0.00301 -0.00402 -0.00394 -0.00415
(0.00514) (0.00533) (0.00515) (0.00516) (0.00515)
Rice Production Area (mu) 0.00161 0.00161 0.00159 0.00161 0.00163
(0.000995) (0.00101) (0.000974) (0.000987) (0.00101)
No. of Observations 2,137 2,161 2,137 2,137 2,137
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.129 0.131 0.130 0.129 0.131
P-value of Joint-significance:
Intensive Information Session 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Notes: Robust clustered (to village level) standard errors in parentheses. The estimation is based on the sample of participants in 
the two first-round sessions (T1, T2).  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                                                                                  
Insurance Take-up (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
Table A3. Heterogeneity of the Intensive Session Effect
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VARIABLES
Sample: First round session participants (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Default (1 = Buy, 0 = Not Buy) 0.208*** 0.169*** 0.13 0.194*** 0.148
(0.0437) (0.0374) (0.086) (0.0393) (0.112)
Heterogeneity Effects:
    Intensive Information Session 0.194*** 0.146*** 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.146***
    (1 = Yes, 0 = No) (0.0348) (0.0258) (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0258)
    Intensive*Default -0.102**
(0.0512)
    Education 0.123***
    (1 = Above average, 0 = Below average) (0.0339)
    Education*Default -0.0419
(0.0454)
    Trust on Government (0-1) -0.026
(0.0426)
    Trust on Government*Default 0.0232
(0.066)
    Rice Production Area (mu) 0.00326***
(0.000810)
    Rice production Area*Default -0.00285**
(0.00110)
    Age 0.00221
(0.00139)
    Age*Default 0.000103
(0.00204)
    Male -0.0381 -0.0362 -0.0399 -0.0437 -0.0358
(0.0478) (0.0471) (0.0476) (0.0473) (0.0470)
    Household Size -0.00212 -0.000811 -0.00158 -0.00150 -0.000811
(0.00555) (0.00565) (0.00556) (0.00553) (0.00565)
Observations 2,137 2,161 2,137 2,137 2,161
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.057 0.060 0.054 0.058 0.059
P-value of Joint-significance:
Default (1 = Buy, 0 = Not Buy) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000***
Insurance Take-up (1 = Yes, 0 = No)    
Table A4. Heterogeneity of the Default Effect     
Notes: Robust clustered (to village level) standard errors in parentheses. The estimation is based on the sample of 
participants in the two first-round sessions (T1, T2).  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                                                                                                  
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B An Insurance Demand Model
In this section, we present an insurance demand model to explain why social networks
can influence both the level and the slope of the insurance demand curve. The
intuition is as follows. Since the farmers in our study are largely unfamiliar with the
benefits of insurance, these benefits have a subjective expected value. As a result, the
level and slope of the insurance demand curve are determined by farmers’ perceptions
and uncertainty about the expected benefits of the product, and by the distribution
of the expected benefits at an aggregate level. For an individual farmer, the certainty
and level of his value for the insurance product depend on his understanding of the
product. This understanding can be influenced by formal training, through learning
about the product from knowledgeable friends, or by experiencing the value of the
product directly or indirectly. Moreover, the effectiveness of information diffusion
through the social network determines the level of concentration in the distribution
of the farmer’s expected product benefits. As a consequence, we expect that the
diffusion of information through social networks can affect both the level and the
slope of the insurance demand curve.
B.1 Individual Insurance Demand
A rural household i with wealth ω faces uncertainty about future production income
due to possible natural disasters, which will cost him Z. Z is a random variable and
follows a normal distribution N (µz, σ2z). An insurance product can be purchased to
hedge the risk at a premium P . However, due to unfamiliarity with the insurance
program, each household has its own perception of the insurance benefit, which is
denoted by i ∼ N (µi , σi). Without insurance contract, the expected utility of the
household is
E (U(ω − Z))
If the household purchased the insurance contract, then its expected utility is
E (U(ω − P + i))
Therefore, the household should purchase the insurance if and only if
E (U(ω − P + i)) ≥ E (U(ω − Z)) (11)
Assume that the household has a CARA utility function U(X) = −e−AX , then
E (U(ω − Z)) = −e−Ai(ω−µz)+ 12A2i σ2z
E (U(ω − P + i)) = −e−Ai(ω−P+µi )+ 12A2i σ2i
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Replacing these in condition (11), we have
− e−Ai(ω−P+µi )+ 12A2i σ2ii ≥ −e−Ai(ω−µz)+ 12A2i σ2z
⇐⇒ µi ≥ P − µz −
1
2
Ai(σ
2
z − σ2i) (12)
As a result, at the individual level, households with a higher expectation and a lower
uncertainty of the value of the insurance product are more likely to buy it. Since
receiving insurance knowledge through various means - either through participating
in intensive session or obtaining information from friends, or by observing friends
purchasing insurance or receiving payouts, can all influence households’ expectation
of the product benefits and uncertainty about it, we expect that these factors have
significant effects on individual insurance demand. Additionally, individuals who are
more risk averse are more likely to buy the insurance.
B.2 Aggregate Insurance Demand
To study the determinants of the level and slope of the insurance demand curve,
we assume that the perceived benefit of the insurance, µi , is distributed with some
CDF F (.) and that the risk aversion coefficient and the variance is the same for all
household, Ai = A, σ2i = σ
2
 , ∀i. Based on those assumptions, we can aggregate (16)
to obtain the insurance demand curve:
Q(P ) = 1− F
(
P − µz − 1
2
A(σ2z − σ2 )
)
(13)
and the slope of the demand curve
∂Q
∂P
= −f
(
P − µz − 1
2
A(σ2z − σ2 )
)
(14)
where f(.) is the pdf. Equation (14) tells us that the perceived product benefits,
the uncertainty about insurance benefits, and the dispersion on the valuation of the
product, can affect the slope of the demand curve.
To give a specific example, let’s look at Figure B1. fl denotes the original distribu-
tion of the perceived expected value of the insurance contract in the population, with
a corresponding demand curve Dl in Figure B2. For people who had more friends
participated in intensive session or who received payouts, the distribution changes.
First, these people may have higher perceived expected insurance benefits on aver-
age. Second, the distribution becomes more concentrated, i.e. smaller variance than
before. In Figure B1, the distribution now shifts to fh. As a result, the demand curve
will shift upward. In the low price region, because the density of the pivotal value µi
is lower, the demand curve will be flatter, as indicated in the shaded region of Figure
B2. The demand falls sharply over the price region where the corresponding pivotal
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value of µi has high density, i.e. the concentrated region of the distribution fh.
In order to derive the impact on the insurance demand curve of perceived benefits,
dispersion on the product valuation, and the uncertainty about the benefits, we need
to specify the distribution of µi . Let F (.) be the CDF of a Normal distribution
with mean η and variance ψ2, and Φ(.)/φ(.) be the CDF/PDF of a standard normal
distribution. Then F (x) = Φ
(
x−η
ψ
)
and f(x) = 1
ψ
φ
(
x−η
ψ
)
. The demand curve in
equation (13) becomes:
Q(P ) = 1− Φ
(
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ
)
(15)
and the slope of the demand curve is
S(P ) ≡ ∂Q
∂P
= − 1
ψ
φ
(
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ
)
(16)
• Mean of perceived insurance benefit (η):
∂Q
∂η
(P ) =
1
ψ
φ
(
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ
)
(17)
∂S
∂η
(P ) = −P − µz −
1
2
A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ3
φ
(
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ
)
(18)
From equation (17) and (18), an increase in η has a positive level effect on the
insurance demand curve, as φ(.) is positive everywhere. The impact on the
slope of demand curve is more subtle. The slope will increase (demand curve
will be flatter) if P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 ) − η < 0, and the slope will decrease
(demand curve will be steeper) if P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η > 0.
• Dispersion of benefits valuation (ψ):
∂Q
∂ψ
(P ) =
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ2
φ
(
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ
)
(19)
∂S
∂ψ
(P ) =
1
ψ2
φ
(
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ
)
− (P − µz −
1
2
A(σ2z − σ2 )− η)2
ψ4
φ
(
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ
)
=
ψ2 − (P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η)2
ψ4
φ
(
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ
)
(20)
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From equation (19) and (20), an increase in ψ has a level effect on the demand
curve. The direction depends on the sign of P −µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η: positive
if P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 ) − η > 0, negative if P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 ) − η < 0.
The impact on the slope of the demand curve depends on the sign of ψ2− (P −
µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η)2. The slope will decrease (demand curve will be steeper)
if ψ2 − (P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 ) − η)2 < 0, and the slope will increase (demand
curve will be flatter) if ψ2 − (P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η)2 > 0.
• Uncertainty about insurance benefits (σ2 ):
∂Q
∂σ2
(P ) = − A
2ψ
φ
(
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ
)
(21)
∂S
∂σ2
(P ) =
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ3
2Aφ
(
P − µz − 12A(σ2z − σ2 )− η
ψ
)
(22)
From (21) and (22), the uncertainty about insurance benefits has a negative
effect on the level of demand curve. However, the impact on the slope of demand
curve depends on the sign of P −µz− 12A(σ2z−σ2 )−η. The impact is positive if
P −µz− 12A(σ2z−σ2 )−η > 0, and it is negative if P −µz− 12A(σ2z−σ2 )−η < 0.
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Figure B1. An Example of the Distribution of Perceived Insurance Benefits
Figure B2. An Example of Insurance Demand Curve
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